Individual #logic.philosophy  the branch of philosophy that analyzes inference
  >part of:  #philosophy  the rational investigation of questions about existence and knowledge and ethics
  url:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic
  >part:  #modal_logic.logic  the logical study of necessity and possibility
  >part:  km#inductive_reasoning_system__inductivereasoningsystem  study of deriving a "reliable" ("inductively valid") generalization from observations
  >part:  km#deductive_reasoning_system__deductivereasoningsystem  an inference is "deductively valid" if and only if there is no possible situation in which all the premises are true and the conclusion false
  >part:  km#binary_logic__boolean_logic__booleanlogic  logic where the principle of bivalence is respected; this principle states that for any proposition P, either P is true or P is false
  >part:  km#multi-valued_logic__many-valued_logic  logic in which there are more than two possible truth values
     >part:  km#fuzzy_logic__fuzzylogic
     >part:  km#probability_logic__probabilitylogic
  >part:  km#informal_logic  study of logic as used in natural language arguments
  >part:  km#formal_logic
     >part:  km#philosophical_logic__philosophicallogic  deals with formal descriptions of natural language and hence philosophical logicians have contributed a great deal to the development of non-standard logics
     >part:  km#mathematical_logic__symbolic_logic__metamathematics__metamathematic
        >part:  km#application_of_techniques_of_formal_logic_to_mathematics
           >part:  km#logicism  pioneered by philosopher-logicians such as Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell: the idea was that mathematical theories were logical tautologies, and the programme was to show this by means to a reduction of mathematics to logic. The various attempts to carry this out met with a series of failures, from the crippling of Frege's project in his Grundgesetze by Russell's Paradox, to the defeat of Hilbert's Program by Gödel's incompleteness theorems; however, every rigorously defined mathematical theory can be exactly captured by a first-order logical theory; Frege's proof calculus is enough to describe the whole of mathematics, though not equivalent to it
        >part:  km#application_of_mathematical_techniques_to_formal_logic
        >part:  km#sentential_logic__propositional_logic__propositional_calculus  proof theory for reasoning with propositional formulas as symbolic logic; it is extensional
        >part:  km#predicate_logic__predicatelogic__predicate_calculus  permits the formulation of quantified statements such as "there is at least one X such that..." or "for any X, it is the case that...", where X is an element of a set called the domain of discourse
           >part:  km#FOL__first-order_logic__firstorderlogic__first-order_predicate_calculus__predicate_logic__predicatelogic  FOL is distinguished from HOL in that it does not allow statements such as "for every property, it is the case that..." or "there exists a set of objects such that..."; it is a stronger theory than sentential logic, but a weaker theory than arithmetic, set theory, or second-order logic; it is strong enough to formalize all of set theory and thereby virtually all of mathematics
              >part:  km#PCEF_logic__logic_of_positive_conjunctive_existential_formulas
           >part:  km#HOL__higher-order_logic  based on a hierarchy of types
        >part:  km#logic_for_reasoning_about_computer_programs
           >part:  km#Hoare_logic
           >part:  km#logic_for_reasoning_about_concurrent_processes_or_mobile_processes
              >part:  km#CSP
              >part:  km#CCS
              >part:  km#pi-calculus
           >part:  km#logic_for_capturing_computability__logicforcapturingcomputability
              >part:  km#computability_logic__computabilitylogic
     >part:  km#non-modal_logic__nonmodallogic__extensional_logic__extensionallogic  as opposed to intensional logics, the truth value of a complex sentence is determined by the truth values of its sub-sentences
     >part:  km#modal_logic__intensional_logic__intensionallogic  sentences are qualified by modalities such as possibly and necessarily; both "Bush is president" and "2+2=4" are true, yet "Necessarily, Bush is president" is false, while "Necessarily, 2+2=4" is true
        >part:  km#deontic_logic__deonticlogic
        >part:  km#epistemic_logic__epistemiclogic
        >part:  km#temporal_logic  system of rules and symbolism for representing, and reasoning about, propositions qualified in terms of time
           >part:  km#tense_logic__tenselogic
           >part:  km#computational_tree_logic__CTL
           >part:  km#linear_temporal_logic
        >part:  km#conditional_logic__conditionallogic
     >part:  km#classical_logic
     >part:  km#non_classical_logic
     >part:  km#type_theory  branch of mathematics and logic that concerns itself with classifying entities into sets called types
     >part:  km#term_logic__traditional_logic__traditionallogic
        >part:  #Aristotelian_logic
     >part:  km#dialectical_logic__dialecticallogic

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